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I N RECENT YEARS systematic theologians have been showing increased interest in studying the doctrine of the Trinity. An integral part of that study should be an exposition of the origins of the doctrine. The question of origins can be posed in an analytical fashion, as Maurice Wiles has done:
.. .we seem forced to choose between three possibilities:
either (1) we do after all know about the Trinity through a revelation in the form of propositions concerning the inner mysteries of the Godhead; or (2) there is an inherent threefoldness about every act of God's revelation, which requires us to think in trinitarian terms of the nature of God, even though we cannot speak of the different persons of the Trinity being responsible for specific facets of God's revelation; or (3) our Trinity of revelation is an arbitrary analysis of the activity of God, which though of value in Christian thought and devotion is not of essential significance. 1 I think that this analytical approach is in important respects secondary to the genetic one. The first Christians spoke about God in the terms which we now try to analyze; surely the reasons why they used those terms are most relevant to a sound analysis.
The main words whose usage needs to be fathomed are the Greek words prosöpon, hypostasis, ousia, andphysis.
since she is studying commentaries on the Psalms and has more interesting and extensive Greek material with which to work. She shows how what she calls prosopological 8 exegesis was, in the hands of the Fathers, not only "a tool of literary analysis and historical identification, but also and especially one of spiritual perception and theological elaboration," 9 and its applications extended into the doctrines of the Trinity, inspiration, Christ, and the Church. It was also the source of the use of persona/ prosöpon in Christian theology, although, as these terms were adapted to use in Trinitarian doctrine, Christology, and ecclesiology, new theological meanings displaced their specialized literary and dramatic sense. While Rondeau's excellent book corrects the imbalance in Andresen's article, I would contest some particular points of his to which she does not object: his division of prosopological exegesis into two distinct types, represented by Justin and Tertullian respectively, 10 and his proposal that in the Greek East this style of exegesis was so characteristic of Sabellians and Marcellus of Ancyra that more orthodox writers were reluctant to use it in developing their Trinitarian ideas.
11 But I prefer to defer a detailed discussion of Andresen's whole article to another occasion; But when you listen to the words of the prophets spoken "as from a person" {hös apo prosòpou), 13 
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Tertullian takes up this method in Prax. 11, where he uses it to refute the monarchian attempt to collapse all real distinctions in the Godhead. Citing several passages from the Psalms and Isaiah, he derives from them a rule that "the one who speaks and the one about whom he speaks and the one to whom he speaks cannot be seen as one and the same." 16 What 13 Bernard Dominique Marliangeas, Clés pour une théologie du ministère: In persona Christi, in persona ecclesiae (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978) 34, gives L. Pautigny's translation of these words: "s'exprimer comme en leur propre nom, n which I think is misleading, like Rondeau's ".. .prononcées par les prophètes à la première personne" (2, 24). Justin's awkward locution points to occasions when the prophets are speaking in someone else's name, but do not state the fact explicitly.
14 theiou logou. It would be inappropriate to press this terminology to Trinitarian conclusions and claim that, in Justin's mind, it was not the divine Spirit who was responsible for the inspiration of the prophets (see, e.g., 1 Apol 61: ".. .the Holy Spirit, who through the prophets foretold everything about Jesus"). 15 Irenaeus speaks of using the same procedure: "... so consequently God is addressing one and the same person, that is, I say, Christ the Son of God. Since David says: The Lord hath said to me, one must say that it is not David who is speaking; nor does any other at all of the prophets speak in his own name, for it is not a man who utters the prophecy; but the Spirit of God, taking form and shape in the likeness of the person concerned, spoke in the prophets; sometimes He spoke on the part of Christ, sometimes on that of the Father. So most properly does Christ report in the first person, through David, the Father's speech with Him; and most properly also does He say the other things too through the prophets in the first person..." {Epid. Justin identifies the one they met with the God who appeared to Abraham at Mamre. Trypho attempts to divide the being whom Moses met in the burning bush into two, saying that "it was an angel who was seen in the flame of fire, but God who spoke with Moses, so that in that vision there were two at the same time, both an angel and a God." 35 Justin first notes that this would make no difference to his overall point, since even in that case the God who told Moses He was God of Abraham and God of Isaac and God of Jacob will be not the Maker of the universe but the one who has been shown to you to have appeared to Abraham and to Jacob, who serves the will of the Maker of the universe and who likewise ministered to His will in the judgment on Sodom. So even if, as you say, you should hold that there were two, both an angel and a God, no one who had even a little intelligence will dare to say that the Maker and Father of the universe, having left all that is above the heavens, appeared in a little corner of the earth.
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In fact, the God who appeared to Moses is called "angel" in just the same way as in the accounts of Jacob's meetings with the same God. The key issue for us here is not the nature of the relationship between these two 30 several more which use the phrase ek (tou) prosöpou tou theou, 43 and other places where Philo shows that he reads Scripture with an interpretive framework quite similar to the one we have seen later Christian authors using. In De posteritate Caini 32, 110-11 he notes the several factors which condition an author's choice of style: "Nor is it only persons (prosöpa) and matters dealt with (pragmata) that occasion our speech to vary its form, but the causes (aitiai) too of the things that happen, and the ways in which they happen, and besides these, times (chronoi) and places (topoi) which enter into all things."
44 Philo even provides one instance of prosöpon used of a character in narrative. 45 The evidence from his work supports the theory of a recognized literary method of exegesis.
The considerations we have been presenting can also be illuminated from classical literature, and Andresen has made efforts in that direction. 46 To his suggested parallels may be added the grammarians' use of prosöpon 47 The first to do that were the Gnostics, particularly those concerned to distinguish the Christ from above and the Jesus from below. Irenaeus says: "And besides, they divide the prophecies, wanting some to be said by something from the mother, some by something from the seed, and some by something from the Demiurge. But they also similarly [contend that] Jesus spoke something from the Savior, something from the mother, something from the Demiurge.
,,5° Irenaeus himself refuses to divide either the prophecies or Jesus in this way, 51 and the passages sometimes used to support the contrary view are not compelling. For example, in Haer. 3, 19, 3 we read: "On the one hand, the Logos became quiescent so that he could be tempted and be dishonored and be crucified and die; on the other hand, the human being was taken up by the Logos in his conquering 48 and enduring and rising and being received on high" 52 In Irenaeus this being "quiescent" means refraining from one's proposed impulse. 53 It does not refer to escaping from external influences, and consequently does not mean that the Logos and the human being were doing separate things. Likewise, "was taken up" for him "did not mean the absorption of the human being in the divinity, but the disappearance of human fragility." 54 Irenaeus' intent throughout (not surprisingly, since he was arguing against Gnostics) was to underline the unity of the subject of all Christ's actions and experiences.
Tertullian, however, does begin to separate the Scripture texts involving Jesus and assign them to his divinity and his humanity respectively. The most famous and influential passage is Prax. 27:
The characteristic property of each substance is preserved in so real a way that the Spirit carried on its own activities in him-that is, powers and works and signs-and at the same time the flesh was involved in its passions, hungering in his encounter with Satan, thirsting in his meeting with the Samaritan woman, weeping over Lazarus, disturbed to the point of death, and at length dead. Athanasius engages in Christological prosopological exegesis as well, but he does so with a subtlety which is not always appreciated. A fine example is in Ar. 3, 29-33 , 59 which discusses the "double account of the Savior" in Scripture, according to which .. .the things proper to this flesh are said to belong to him {autou legetai) because he was in it-such things as being hungry, being thirsty, suffering, getting tired, and the like, to which the flesh is susceptible. But the proper works of the Logos himself, such as raising the dead and making the blind see and healing the woman with a hemorrhage, he accomplished through the instrumentality of his own body {dia tou idiou sömatos).
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A further explanation of this comes in Ar. 3, 32: Thus, when it was necessary to raise up Peter's mother-in-law, who was suffering from a fever, humanly 61 he extended his hand but divinely he caused the disease to cease. Likewise, in the case of 'the man blind from birth' it was human spittle which he spat, but divinely he opened the man's eyes by means of clay. And where Lazarus is concerned, he uttered human speech in his capacity as a human being {hôs anthröpos), but divinely, in his capacity as God {hös theos), he raised Lazarus from the dead. 61 Norris (90) has "it was a human act when" for the Greek anthröpinös and "it was a divine act when" for theikös. While in general this is a good translation, it is not adequate when the precise point of this paper is under discussion; so I have taken the liberty of translating the two terms with "humanly" and "divinely" respectively. 62 The end of Ar. 3, 40 is a more compressed example: "Just as he asked questions humanly and raised Lazarus divinely, so the words 'he received* are said of him humanly, while the subjection of the angels gives evidence of the deity of the Logos." See also the middle of Ar. 3, 46, and 3, 56.
Athanasius as a rule
63 does not divide these actions as if they came from two centers of agency, but rather uses either the adverbial approach we see here, or the expressions "as man, as God," or prepositional phrases introduced by kata. 64 65 See, e.g., Inc. 18, where the Word manifests its divinity in the miracles of Jesus, the invisible divine reality being able to be contemplated as the cause of the wonders; Inc. 21, where he hungered dia to idion tou sömatos but did not starve dia ton phorounta auto Kyrion; Inc. 53, where Christ's works done in the body were not human {ouk anthröpina) but belonged to the Word of God {alia ... tou theou logou); Inc. 54, test his works ei anthröpina estin è theou. These are all further linguistic devices by which Athanasius avoids "dividing the sayings." 66 Ar. 2, 12, where the Word is said to have been "made" kata to anthröpinon; 2, 53, which describes Scripture's custom {ethos) thus: when it refers to Christ's origin kata sarka, it assigns the cause {aitia), whereas it speaks of his Godhead absolutely.
67 Sent. Dion. 9, 4. There follow contrasts between tou anthröpinou and hös theos, sömatikös and theikös. 
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It is in the Kata meros pistis, however, that Apollinaris applies the method of grammatical analysis most intensively both to Christology and to Trinitarian theology. First he uses it to establish the reality of the three persons against Sabellius' attempts to introduce an anupostaton ... prosöpon, 71 countering that the prosöpon of each establishes its being and its subsistence.
72 This is founded on Paul's distinction between "of whom" and "by whom" in 1 Cor 8:6, which Apollinaris finds significant. 3, 18, 3) where Irenaeus explains the name "Christ" may be another early reference to the baptism of Jesus as a Trinitarian manifestation: "For in the name of Christ is implied the one who anointed, and he who was anointed, and the anointing itself with which he was anointed. And indeed the Father anointed, but the Son was anointed in the Spirit, which is anointing."
